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ABSTRACT
Adversarial examples have become one of the largest challenges that
machine learning models, especially neural network classifiers, face.
These adversarial examples break the assumption of attack-free
scenario and fool state-of-the-art (SOTA) classifiers with insignif-
icant perturbations to human. So far, researchers achieved great
progress in utilizing adversarial training as a defense. However,
the overwhelming computational cost degrades its applicability
and little has been done to overcome this issue. Single-Step adver-
sarial training methods have been proposed as computationally
viable solutions, however they still fail to defend against iterative
adversarial examples. In this work, we first experimentally analyze
several different SOTA defense methods against adversarial exam-
ples. Then, based on observations from experiments, we propose
a novel single-step adversarial training method which can defend
against both single-step and iterative adversarial examples. Lastly,
through extensive evaluations, we demonstrate that our proposed
method outperforms the SOTA single-step and iterative adversar-
ial training defense. Compared with ATDA (single-step method) on
CIFAR10 dataset, our proposed method achieves 35.67% enhance-
ment in test accuracy and 19.14% reduction in training time. When
compared with methods that use BIM or Madry examples (iterative
methods) on CIFAR10 dataset, it saves up to 76.03% in training time
with less than 3.78% degeneration in test accuracy.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Theory of computation→Adversarial learning; • Comput-
ing methodologies→ Neural networks.
KEYWORDS
adversarial machine learning, adversarial training
1 INTRODUCTION
Adversarial examples were discovered and presented in [19] under
image classification tasks by showing that specially designed in-
significant perturbations can effectively mislead neural network
(NN) classifiers. More importantly, it has been shown that such
perturbations are not special cases but rather generic and can be
crafted for almost every input example. Yet, more scary, researchers
show that adversaries could arbitrarily control the prediction re-
sults as desired with high success rate through carefully designed
perturbations [3][8].
Thereafter, great effort has been devoted to designing defense
methods against adversarial examples. Some of these methods uti-
lize augmentation and regularization to enhance test accuracy on
adversarial examples [15]. Other methods intercepts the input to
the classifier to either identify and drop adversarial examples or
eliminate adversarial perturbations [13][16]. Currently, the most
popular choices of defense methods are based on adversarial train-
ing [12].
The fundamental idea of adversarial training is to use adversarial
examples as blind spots and retrain the classifier with them. This
enhances the capability of the classifier to correctly classify the
perturbed examples to their original labels. These defenses could be
categorized based on the adversarial examples they are using. De-
fenses that use single-step adversarial examples are called Single-
Adv, while defenses that use iterative adversarial examples called
Iter-Adv.
Among all existing defense approaches, adversarial training is
shown to be the most successful solution, because unlike many
others, it does not rely on the false sense of security brought by ob-
fuscated gradient [1]. However, adversarial training still has many
unsolved problems. The high computational cost in preparing adver-
sarial examples during training [10] is among the most challenging
ones. If Single-Adv defense is used, the trained model will not be
able to defend against iterative adversarial examples [8]. On the
other hand, Iter-Adv defenses can defend against iterative exam-
ples, however, they require powerful GPU infrastructure for an
ImageNet like datasets [6].
Nowadays, more and more smartphone and smart-home applica-
tions are integrated with machine learning components, especially
the popular NN classifier. These applications are running in an en-
vironment without sufficient local computing power for adversarial
training.Without considering the cost, a cloud server could partially
solve this issue. However, some of these applications, that are run-
ning with sensitive or personal data, are not willing to share their
data and model with a cloud server. Therefore, these applications
lack the tools to defend against adversarial examples.
In general, current adversarial training methods fail to achieve
robust performance with acceptable training overhead. In the fol-
lowing sections, we first provide detailed analysis of the state-of-
the-art (SOTA) defense methods. Then, based on lessons learned
from analysis, we propose a Single-Adv method that can efficiently
mitigate iterative adversarial example with low training overhead
and name it Single-Step Epoch-IterativeMethod (SIM-Adv). Intu-
itively, it flattens iterative adversarial examples (Iter-Exps) into
single-step adversarial examples (Single-Exps) in multiple con-
secutive training epochs as detailed later. Our contributions are
summarized as follows:
• We analyze the SOTA Single-Adv method called ATDA. Our
results indicate that the evaluation of ATDA as presented in
[18] was incomplete because we show that it fails to defend
against many adversarial examples.
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• We analyze the SOTA Iter-Adv methods and identify guide-
lines that can reduce computational overhead while achiev-
ing good performance in defending against Iter-Exps. The
guidelines include: (1) using large per step perturbation and
(2) utilizing the intermediate examples during the prepara-
tion of Iter-Exps.
• Based on the observations from the analysis, we propose
a novel Single-Adv method which is the first in this cate-
gory that can defend against both Single-Exps and Iter-Exps
while maintaining very low training overhead. This method
opens the door for the applications with limited computing
power to build computationally efficient self defenses against
adversarial examples.
The rest of the work is organized as follows. Section 2 sum-
marizes important background material. Sections 3 and 4 present
detailed analysis of different SOTA adversarial training methods.
Section 5 introduces our cost-effective Single-Adv method. Section
6 presents evaluation results and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we review the fundamental material and provide
references for further understanding of the concepts presented in
this work.
2.1 Adversarial Examples
As mentioned in Section 1, adversarial examples are specially per-
turbed original examples which aim to fool the NN classifier. Al-
though adversarial examples can be categorized according to differ-
ent aspects, we focus here on the distinction between Single-Exps
and Iter-Exps. Adversarial examples throughout this work are l∞
white-box untargeted adversarial examples in the image classifi-
cation domain. In other words: (1) the perturbation of adversarial
example is limited in an l∞ norm ball, (2) the classifier is transparent
to adversary, and (3) the adversary successfully fools the classifier
as long as the prediction is wrong.
2.1.1 Single-Step Adversarial Examples: In the early stage of ad-
versarial example research, [4] introduces the Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) to generate Single-Exps. FGSM calculates gradients
of the classifier’s loss function, L, towards each original example, xˆ .
Then, it takes the sign of the calculated gradients and multiplies
it with the perturbation limit, ϵ . This product is called adversarial
perturbation, δ , and adding it to the original example can turn it
into adversarial example, x˜ . The mathematical formulation of FGSM
is as follows.
δ = clip[−ϵ,ϵ ][ϵ × siдn[∇xˆL(xˆ ,y,θ )]] (1)
x˜ = clip[0,1][xˆ + δ ] (2)
Here, y is the ground truth label, θ is the parameter of the neural
network classifier, and clip is a function that maps out-of-range
values to the closest boundary and preserves the in-range values.
As can be seen from the formulation, FGSM utilizes a linear
approximation of the loss function value which only calculates
gradients once during the generation process. Therefore, it is a cost-
efficient method to generate adversarial examples and is widely
used in works like [8] and [12].
In addition to FGSM, there are many other methods proposed to
generate Single-Exps. For example, researchers in [20] introduce
the Random Initialized FGSM (R+FGSM) as an attack method to
break defenses that rely on the gradient masking effect.
2.1.2 Iterative Adversarial Examples: Compared with Single-Exps,
Iter-Exps are more serious adversarial examples since they are
harder to be mitigated. Instead of linear approximation on the loss
function value, Iter-Exps are generated by smaller per step pertur-
bations ( ϵn1 ) of the original examples based on gradient calculations
of the loss function , where n1 is a scale factor. The small pertur-
bation process is repeated for a certain number of iterations, n2.
Two widely used methods for generating Iter-Exps are the Basic
Iterative Method (BIM) and the Madry Method (Madry) which are
introduced in [8] and [12], respectively. These two methods utilize
the projected gradient descent method to perturb the example dur-
ing each iteration. The only difference between BIM and Madry is
that Madry randomly perturbs the original example and utilizes it
as the starting point, x˜0, while BIM always starts with the original
example itself. The mathematical formulations are listed below.
δi+1 = clip[−ϵ,ϵ ][
ϵ
n1
× siдn[∇x˜i L(x˜i ,y,θ )]] i ∈ [0,n2] (3)
x˜i+1 = clip[0,1][x˜i + δi+1] x˜0 = xˆ x˜ = x˜n2 (4)
Throughout this work, we represent the different Iter-Exps gener-
ation methods in the following format, “Name(n1,n2)”. For example,
BIM with n1 = n2 = 10 will be represented as BIM(10,10).
2.2 Adversarial Training
The fundamental idea of adversarial training is to use adversarial
examples as blind spots and retrain the classifier with these blind
spots. From a system level point of view, adversarial training can
be represented as a two-step process.
δi+1 = argmax
δ ∈∆
I [C(x + δ |θi ) , y] (5)
θi+1 = argmin
θ
L(x + δi+1,y,θ ) (6)
Here, I is an indicator function, C represents the classifier, L is a
loss function, and ∆ is the feasible set of δ . Starting with a randomly
initialized θ0, the searching of adversarial perturbation (Eq. 5) and
the training of classifier (Eq. 6) will be competing with each other
repeatedly until θ converges.
2.2.1 Single-step Adversarial Training: Early adversarial training
research retrain with Single-Exps (Single-Adv). For example in [4],
researchers apply adversarial training with FGSM examples (FGSM-
Adv), while the work in [20] enhances the FGSM-Adv through
generating FGSM examples based on holdout classifiers. However,
these two as well as many other Single-Adv methods fail to defend
against Iter-Exps. Recently, a SOTA Single-Adv method (ATDA) is
introduced in [18] which claims to defend against both Single-Exps
and Iter-Exps. To achieve this, the method utilizes FGSM examples
and a domain adaptation loss function. However, as we show later,
the domain adaptation does not help adversarial training and hence
the ATDA trained classifier fails to defend against Iter-Exps.
2.2.2 Iterative Adversarial Training: To defend against both Single-
Exps and Iter-Exps, researchers combine adversarial training with
Iter-Exps (Iter-Adv). Among these methods, adversarial training
2
with BIM examples (BIM-Adv) and Madry examples (Madry-Adv)
are common choices due to their relatively high classification ac-
curacy as shown in [8] and [12], respectively. Based on these two
defense methods, the work in [6] claims to improve the defense by
utilizing a logit pairing loss function. However, as mentioned in [1]
and [7], all these Iter-Adv methods are computationally expensive.
This problem makes Iter-Adv methods not very practical, especially
in platforms with limited computing power.
3 ANALYSIS OF THE ATDA METHOD
Single-Adv methods have the advantage of less computation over-
head compared with Iter-Adv methods. However, most of Single-
Adv methods fail to defend against Iter-Exps. However, a recent
method dubbed ATDA has been introduced in [18] as the SOTA
Single-Adv method that defends against both Single-Exps and Iter-
Exps by adding the so-called domain adaptation loss. In the fol-
lowing, we thoroughly analyze ATDA by presenting its detailed
prediction on Iter-Exps (BIM and Madry examples) and comparing
with other defenses.
3.1 Details of the ATDA Method
The fundamental idea of ATDA is to combine adversarial training
with domain adaptation. The authors of ATDA believe that Single-
Exps (e.g. FGSM examples) could be envisioned as limited number
of samples in the adversarial domain. Therefore, combining domain
adaptation methods could enhance the performance of Single-Adv.
In its design, ATDA utilizes both unsupervised and supervised
domain adaptations as follows.
3.1.1 Unsupervised Domain Adaptation: The authors assume that
both the predictions of original examples, Xˆ = {xˆ}, and adversarial
examples, X˜ = {x˜}, follow two different multivariate normal dis-
tributions. To align these two distributions together, the authors
defined a covariance distance as
LCORAL = 1
k2
| |Cov[C(Xˆ )] −Cov[C(X˜ )]| |l1 (7)
where C(·) represents the predictions, Cov[·] represents the covari-
ance matrix and k denotes the number of classes in the predictions.
In addition to that, authors also utilize the standard distribution
distance metric in [2] and the sum of these two distances is defined
as the unsupervised domain adaptation loss.
LMMD = 1
k
| | 1|Xˆ | Σxˆ ∈Xˆ
C(xˆ) − 1|X˜ | Σx˜ ∈X˜
C(x˜)| |1 (8)
LUDA = LCORAL + LMMD (9)
3.1.2 Supervised Domain Adaptation: In order to utilize the ground
truth information in the training dataset, ATDA proposes a new
loss function to minimize the intra-class variations and maximize
the inter-class variations.
LSDA = 1(k − 1)(|Xˆ | + |X˜ |)× (10)
Σ
x ∈Xˆ∪X˜
Σ
ϕm ∈Φ\{ϕx }
so f tplus(| |C(x) − ϕx | |1 − ||C(x) − ϕm | |1)
(11)
The | · | counts the number of examples in a set. The so f tplus repre-
sents the function ln(1+ exp(·)). The ϕx is the center of predictions
from examples that has the same ground truth as example x . The
centers of predictions from examples in each ground truth class
are collected in a set which is denoted by Φ = {ϕm |m = 1, 2, ...,k}.
These centers are also updated together with parameters in the NN
based on the following equation.
ϕm ← ϕm − β ·
Σ
x ∈(Xˆ∪X˜ )y=m
(ϕm −C(x))
1 + |(Xˆ ∪ X˜ )y=m |
(12)
Here, (Xˆ ∪ X˜ )y=m represents the subset of original and adversarial
examples that belongs tomth class. Also, β denotes the step size of
the update and is set to be 0.1 according to [18].
3.2 Analyzing Feature Space Encoding
The first step of our analysis targets the feature space encoding
from four different classifiers (vanilla, ATDA, BIM(30,30)-Adv, and
SIM(10,20)-Adv classifiers). We use t-SNE [11] to project the high
dimensional feature encoding from each classifier to a two dimen-
sional space and visualize it in Figure 1. During the analysis, we
sample original examples from MNIST dataset. Examples from a
randomly selected class are used as targets (green dots) while others
are references (blue dots). Corresponding to targets, we generate
adversarial examples (red dots). In the visualized feature space en-
coding, examples that are close to each other and form a group
are much likely to be classified in the same class. Therefore, the
classifier that can defend against adversarial examples should have
a visualization where green and red dots are blended together.
From Figure 1a, we can see that the feature encoding of adversar-
ial examples (BIM(30,30) examples) form several individual small
groups are clearly different from the feature encoding of targets
(green dots). Without the color, we can barely tell the difference
between small groups of references (blue dots) and adversarial ex-
amples (red dots). When using the ATDA classifier, this problem is
slightly mitigated since the red dots are grouped together in Figure
1b. However, from Figure 1b, the groups of green dots and red dots
are still separable. BIM(30,30)-Adv and our SIM(10,20)-Adv classi-
fiers presented in Figures 1d and 1e are significantly better than
the ATDA classifier since the red and green dots are blended. It’s
worth recalling that our SIM(10,20)-Adv belongs to Single-Adv and
takes less training time than ATDA as presented later. Therefore,
our method outperforms ATDA in both accuracy and training time
as detailed in later sections. Finally, we add an extra visualization
for the ATDA classifier and change the adversarial examples to
FGSM examples. Compared with BIM(30,30) examples which are
Iter-Exps, the FGSM examples are weaker Single-Exps. In Figure
1c, the red and green dots are blended which means, as expected,
that the ATDA classifier performs well against FGSM (Single-Exps)
examples.
3.3 Overfitting to FGSM Examples
Although we show that ATDA classifier has degenerated perfor-
mance on BIM examples by analyzing feature space encoding, its
numerical results, accuracy, in [18] does not reflect the same find-
ing. A possible reason is that the perturbation limit is too small
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Original Examples from a 
Randomly Selected Class
Adversarial Examples 
corresponding to Green dots
Original Examples from all 
other Classes (9 in total)
Figure 1: Comparing the Feature Space Encoding of Vanilla, ATDA, BIM(30,30)-Adv, and SIM(10,20)-Adv Classifiers
α FGSM BIM(30,30) Madry(30,30)
MNIST e
−3 96.37% 73.97% 54.75%
e−4 98.03% 19.91% 1.23%
FMNIST e
−3 83.59% 49.41% 32.31%
e−4 84.03% 33.82% 11.37%
Table 1: Test Accuracy of the ATDA with Different α
compared with previous works such as [12]. Moreover, while exper-
imenting with the source code, we locate another possible reason,
the tuned learning rate α = e−3.
We evaluate ATDA classifiers with different values of α as shown
in Table 1. The results show that the test accuracy on both BIM(30,30)
and Madry(30,30) examples significantly degenerates when we de-
crease α . When α = e−4, the ATDA performs in a similar way as
FGSM-Adv in [20]. Actually, [20] has shown that FGSM-Adv causes
the trained classifier to overfit FGSM examples and be vulnerable
to Iter-Exps. It is intuitive that optimizing with a smaller learning
rate should converge to the same location if not a better location.
Therefore, the degeneration in Table 1 means that the objective
function in ATDA, combining FGSM-Adv and domain adaptation
losses, is not appropriate for correct classification of Iter-Exps.
3.4 Vulnerability to Randomness
Although previous subsections show that ATDA cannot defend
Iter-Exps due to inappropriate objective function, the reason could
solely be the usage of FGSM examples in the training. To pinpoint
the effect of domain adaptation loss, we design another experiment
which uses BIM examples instead of FGSM examples for training.
We choose BIM(30,30)-Adv as the baseline and combine it with the
domain adaptation loss proposed by ATDA. Our experiments are
conducted on both MNIST and FMNIST datasets with BIM(30,30)
and Madry(30,30) examples. Moreover, we assign different values
to λ, a parameter that controls the weight of domain adaptation
loss.
Figure 2 presents the results of this experiment. When λ = 0, the
classifier is solely trainedwith the cross-entropy loss. As λ increases,
the domain adaptation loss becomes more and more important in
the total training loss. To our surprise, this experiment exposes
another vulnerability of ATDA. Compared with cross-entropy loss,
the domain adaptation loss does not make extra positive impact
on the test accuracy. The test accuracy on BIM(30,30) examples
remains unchanged or shows a small degeneration. Even worse,
the domain adaptation loss hurts the test accuracy of the classifier
on Madry(30,30) examples, especially when λ ≥ 0.15. We think a
reasonable explanation is that the randomness in Madry examples
breaks the statistical assumption used in the domain adaptation
loss.
3.5 Summary
In this section, we show that ATDA cannot defend Iter-Exps. Firstly,
ATDA’s feature space encoding shows that it miserably fails against
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Figure 2: Evaluation of the Domain
Adaptation Loss
Figure 3: Experimental Results on
Per Step Perturbation
Figure 4: Experimental Results on
Intermediate Examples
Iter-Exps. Secondly, by changing the learning rate, we show that
the objective function of the ATDA does not take Iter-Exps into
consideration. Lastly, by combining domain adaptation loss with
Iter-Adv, we show that relying on domain adaptation loss degener-
ates the accuracy of classifying Iter-Exps with randomness (Madry
examples). Although the analysis is done in MNIST and FMNIST
datasets, our further evaluation results on CIFAR10 dataset (Sec 6)
also show that ATDA performs poorly in defending Iter-Exps.
4 ANALYSIS OF ITER-ADV METHODS
Compared with Single-Adv methods, Iter-Adv methods have signif-
icantly higher test accuracy. Therefore, the majority of adversarial
training defenses, including the SOTA ones, focus on Iter-Adv meth-
ods. In spite of this, the domain is still not very well comprehended.
In this section, we explore several fundamental questions regarding
SOTA Iter-Adv methods through extensive set of experiments.
4.1 Limit of Decreasing the Per Step
Perturbation
Based on the introduction of Iter-Exps in Section 1, it is clear that
the smaller per step perturbation applied, the better observation of
NN’s decision hyperplane and the stronger adversarial examples
obtained. However, to select an appropriate per step perturbation,
we believe that a quantitative analysis is needed.
To do this analysis, we conduct experiments on MNIST, FMNIST,
and CIFAR10 datasets. In each dataset, we train two different NN
classifiers with the same structure and hyper-parameter settings,
which include: (1) a Vanilla classifier trained on original examples
only and (2) a BIM-Adv classifier [7]. For each n1 = n2 value in the
range Z[0,30], we generate BIM examples with fixed ϵ (0.3 in MNIST,
0.2 in FMNIST, and 8255 in CIFAR10) and calculate the following
ratio, ρ:
ρ =
error rate under current value of n1 and n2
error rate under the maximum value of n1 and n2
(13)
To understand ρ, assume that its value is 1 when, for example,
n1 = n2 = 10. And, the maximum value of n1 and n2 is 30 (e.g. with
MNIST dataset). This means that BIM examples generated with
value n1 = n2 = 10 can be as successful as those generated with
value n1 = n2 = 30 in misleading the classifier.
From the results in Figure 3, it is clear that ρ converges fast and
saturates when the value of n1 = n2 is around 5 in all six lines.
For the Vanilla classifiers, this phenomenon is not surprising since
they have no defence at all and most of the adversarial examples
can fool them. However, we see a similar trend from the BIM-Adv
classifiers which are well trained to defend adversarial examples.
The insight we draw from this experiment is that increasing the
value of n1 = n2 over a certain limit provides only marginal help in
finding stronger adversarial examples. In other words, training a
classifier by Iter-Adv method with smalln1 = n2 values (around 5 in
this experiment) is as efficient as training the classifier by Iter-Adv
with large n1 = n2 values (30 in this experiment).
Given the fact that adversarial training uses adversarial examples
to find blind spots of the under-trained classifier and retrain it, these
results show that decreasing the per step perturbation of Iter-Exps
used during Iter-Adv beyond a certain limit only marginally benefits
the defense.
We think the saturation of per step perturbation exists because
the loss structure used in projected gradient descent to search Iter-
Exps is shown to be highly tractable [12]. This important finding
indicates that defenses could use smaller values of n1 = n2 without
sacrificing the quality of the defense. Although the resulting defense
is still within the Iter-Adv category, it consumes less time and
computations in preparing adversarial examples. We will utilize this
observation in combination with the following others to develop
an efficient Single-Adv method.
4.2 Training with Intermediate Adversarial
Examples
As shown in Section 2 Eq. 4, Iter-Adv methods usually use final
adversarial examples (xn2 ) to build the defense since it is much
stronger than intermediate versions (xi , ∀i < n2). In this section,
we explore whether those intermediate examples can be utilized for
training while being generated, instead of sitting idle and waiting
for the final versions.
To do so, we conduct another set of experiments on MNIST,
FMNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. In these experiments, we use the
same NN classifiers, measure the same ratio (ρ as defined in Eq. 13),
and maintain the same perturbation limit used in the preceding
subsection. The only difference is that we here fix the value of n1
(10 for MNIST and FMNIST, 7 for CIFAR10) andn2 (30 for all) in BIM
examples. Values along the X-axis in Figure 4 correspond to different
iterations during the generation of BIM examples. For example in
MNIST, an X-axis value of zero corresponds to the original examples,
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a value of 0 < i < 30 represents the corresponding intermediate
examples after i iterations, and a value of 30 corresponds to the
final versions, BIM(10,30), of the adversarial examples.
The results show that ρ, under all the scenarios, is monotoni-
cally increasing with the number of iterations. For all three Vanilla
classifiers which have no defense against adversarial examples, ρ
saturates quickly after around 5 iterations. Although ρ for BIM-Adv
classifiers does not saturate as quick as that for Vanilla classifiers, it
increases almost exponentially before reaches around 0.8 (MNIST
and FMNIST) or 0.9 (CIFAR10). In the zoom-in view of Figure 4,
we can clearly see these turning points. One interesting observa-
tion is that the turning point in BIM-Adv classifier corresponds the
selected value of n1 (10 or 7).
Our insights from this experiment is that: a large portion of inter-
mediate examples of Iter-Exps are good quality adversarial examples
since they effectively reveal the classifier’s blind spot, and hence can
be used to build high quality defenses. In other words, we can utilize
the intermediate examples during the preparation of Iter-Exps to
continuously enhance the model instead of waiting for the final
examples while training Iter-Adv defenses. In Section 5, we build on
this finding to expand the generation process of Iter-Exps and end
up with a Single-Adv method that performs very close to Iter-Adv.
4.3 Summary
In this section, we identify two experimental properties of Iter-
Adv: (1) It is recommended to use large per step perturbation, i.e.,
small n1 and (2) intermediate examples can be used to speed up
adversarial training with a very small degeneration in Iter-Exps
quality.
5 SINGLE-STEP EPOCH-ITERATIVE METHOD
In previous sections, we conduct experiments and evaluate both
Single-Adv and Iter-Adv methods in details. The insights from the
results help us enhance our understanding of adversarial train-
ing and its underlying fundamental concepts. In this section, we
propose a new Single-Adv method which we call Single-Step Epoch-
Iterative Method.
5.1 Motivation and Design
In Figure 8, we review the process of adversarial training. Each row
in the figure represents a training epoch and the solid black lines
represent the data flow (training examples). The dashed red lines
across different rows correspond to knowledge flow (classifier’s
weights) from one epoch to the next. As shown in the figure, the
original examples are fed into the generator of adversarial exam-
ples, which could be single-step or iterative. Then, the original and
adversarial examples are used to train the classifier. The training
process consists of several training epochs and the weights of the
classifier are carried out from one training epoch to the next.
Inspired by the empirical findings drawn from our previous
experiments (Section 4), we propose the following modifications to
enhance the Single-Adv defense process. Similar to other Single-
Adv methods, our method also uses the single-step generator to
reduce computation overhead in each epoch. Recall that a classifier
which is trained with Single-Adv fails to defend Iter-Exps, therefore,
we use consecutive training epochs to mimic the generation of Iter-
Exps.
Starting from the second training epoch, we reuse the output of
the generator from the previous epoch as input to the generator of
the current epoch, instead of using the original image. As a result,
the classifier can be seen as trained with intermediate examples in
the first (n2−1) training epochs. In each training epoch, our method
uses a relatively large per step perturbation (i.e., small n1) instead
of total perturbation (i.e., n1 = 1). It helps our method to avoid
repeatedly generating Single-Exps for training. On the other hand,
a large per step perturbation ensures the adversarial examples can
quickly reach their maximum perturbation. Therefore, it can miti-
gate the degeneration caused by training with weak intermediate
examples in the first few training epochs. Lastly, after repeating
aforementioned steps for n2 epochs, the generator switches to se-
lect original examples as inputs which means the iteration over
consecutive epochs is reset.
From a high level point of view, we flatten the iteration of gen-
erating Iter-Exps into training epochs. Within each iteration of
n2 consecutive training epochs, the mathematical formulation of
generating adversarial examples is as follows.
δi+1 = clip[−ϵ,ϵ ][
ϵ
n1
× siдn[∇x˜i L(x˜i ,y,θ )]] (14)
x˜i+1 = clip[0,1][x˜i + δi+1] (15)
x˜0 = xˆ i ∈ [0,n2] (16)
Here, i represents the index of iteration over training epochs. Sim-
ilar as traditional adversarial training method, we also present the
process of SIM-Adv as a flow chart in Figure 6.
5.2 Applying Over-Perturbation
In the previous subsection, we present the core design of using
Single-Exps to mimic Iter-Exps. At the same time, we also men-
tion the potential disadvantage of this design. In the majority of
training epochs, our method uses the intermediate examples. Recall
the experiment results in Figure 4, these intermediate examples
are less serious than the corresponding Iter-Exps. Based on our
experimental results, the classifier directly trained with the SIM
examples can defend against adversarial examples but performs
worse than that trained with Iter-Exps.
To further mitigate the gap in performance, we now introduce
a heuristic modification of the hyper-parameter setting which we
call it over-perturbation. For the first time, we define two different
hyper-parameter settings in adversarial training methods. We define
that the setting is over-perturbation when n1 < n2, otherwise is under-
perturbation. This modification is based on our empirical results.
As aforementioned, the intermediate examples are less serious than
final Iter-Exps. However, the zoom-in view in Figure 4 shows the
existence of turning point in the iteration index and its connection
to the value of n1. Before the turning point, the success rate to
mislead classifiers by intermediate examples is much lower than
that by Iter-Exps but increases exponentially, and vice versa.
By applying over-perturbation, we actually ensure that ourmethod
trains the classifier with strong adversarial examples in most of the
training epochs. Assume we run 20 epochs of training with two
settings (1) n1 = n2 = 10 and (2) 2n1 = n2 = 20. Under the first
setting, the classifier is trained with intermediate examples before
6
Figure 5: Training with Single-Exps
or Iter-Exps
Figure 6: Training with Single-Step
Epoch-Iterative Examples
Figure 7: Madry-Adv under Differ-
ent Hyper-Parameter Settings
the turning point in both 1st to 9th and 11th to 19th epochs. While,
under the second setting, the intermediate examples used between
10th and 19th epoch are after the turning point. Overall, the second
setting spends more epochs in training the classifier with strong
adversarial examples and the trained classifier performs better on
defending adversarial examples.
Actually, the over-perturbation setting has been used in previ-
ous research works, intentionally or unintentionally. For example
in [12], the hyper-parameter setting of all Madry-Adv methods
are over-perturbation. For curiosity, we try to change the hyper-
parameter setting from under to over-perturbation and record the
performance. In both MNIST and FMNIST datasets, we fix the n2 to
30 and iterativelly reduce the value of n1 from 30 to 10. In each set-
ting, we measure classifier’s test accuracy on both BIM and Madry
examples. These results are presented in Figure 7. To our surprise,
we found that the Madry-Adv with under-perturbation may train
a classifier performs significantly worse than that trained with
over-perturbation (in FMNIST).
For this phenomenon, we believe that it is related to the ran-
dom initialization in Madry-Adv. In some situations, the random
initialization may add unnecessary perturbation to the image and
such perturbation could degenerate the performance of trained
classifier. Under such situations, the over-perturbation makes it
possible to eliminate unnecessary perturbation which enhances
the performance of the trained classifier. More detailed analysis of
combining over-perturbation and Madry-Adv is out of the scope of
this work and we keep it as our future work.
5.3 Searching Space for Adversarial Examples
In order to intuitively show the effectiveness of our proposed
method, we prepare a toy example to compare the search space of
adversarial examples. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the data in this toy example is in a 2 dimensional space. Therefore,
we could easily present the search space of adversarial examples.
In Figure 8, we choose to present the search space of optimal ad-
versarial examples as well as BIM, FGSM and SIM examples.
As we see from the top-left corner, the search space of optimal
adversarial examples is the blue square which represents the entire
norm ball. However, this search space corresponds to the exhaustive
search which cannot be achieved. Among others, the BIM examples
are the best mimic of the optimal adversarial examples. Since it
separate the total perturbation into multiple steps and iteratively
apply small perturbations, the search space of BIM examples can be
represented by the mesh of red dots. The density of dots is related to
the size of per step perturbation. Compared with BIM examples, the
search space of FGSM examples are significantly limited. Since the
total perturbation is applied all at once, the potential locations (red
dots) of FGSM examples can only cover corners and some surface
of the norm ball, while the entire inner space between origin and
perturbation boundary is unreachable.
When we focus on the SIM examples, its search space could be
represented by a mesh of red dots with dynamically changing size.
With a fixed density of dots, the size of the mesh increases from the
smallest one (just around the origin) to the largest one (same size
as the entire norm ball) epoch-by-epoch. Although the searching
space of SIM examples is smaller than that of BIM examples at the
beginning, small n1 value and over-perturbation setting ensure that
most of epochs are searching adversarial examples in the entire
norm ball. Moreover, the analysis of Iter-Exps shows that a relatively
lower density of dots does not significantly affect the searching
of adversarial examples. Last but not the least, SIM examples are
Single-Exps which consumes less computation overhead compared
to the Iter-Exps of BIM.
5.4 Comparing with the Free-Adv
During the preparation of this work, we noticed that there is a
related work, denoted as Free-Adv, that is uploaded to the arXiv
[17]. This work shares a similar design to our paper in generating
adversarial examples. However, our proposed work is different
from it and performs better. Until writing this paper, this work
is still an arXiv paper and has not been accepted as a conference
or journal submission. Therefore, we did not list it as the SOTA
Single-Adv method due to the lack of peer review. However, for
the completeness of our work, we still reimplement, evaluate and
compare it with our proposed method.
During the generation process of adversarial examples, both
the Free-Adv and our proposed method are reusing the gradient
information. In the Free-Adv, the training images in each mini-
batch are Single-Exps. In order to mitigate the issue of training
with Single-Exps, the authors try to replay each mini-batch multi-
ple times (denoted asm) and reuse the adversarial examples from
previous replay as the inputs. Finally, the total training epoch of
the Free-Adv will be decreased by the factor of the total replay
iterations. Although the Free-Adv looks similar to our proposed
method, there are two differences which can distinguish it from
our work.
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Figure 8: Searching Space ofDifferentAdver-
sarial Examples Figure 9: Feature Space Encoding of Free-Adv Classifier
First of all, the proposed algorithm in the Free-Adv replays the
images in the mini-batch immediately which means the classifier is
repeatedly trained with the same mini-batch several times. As the
authors pointed out in [17], such replay could cause the âĂĲcatas-
trophic forgettingâĂİ problem. If the information in the training
data is unbalanced, the classifier could become overfitting through
being repeatedly trained with a certain category of training data.
On the contrary, our proposed method utilizes gradient informa-
tion across different training epochs. In other words, our method
does not change the training order which could be specially de-
signed. Therefore, our method does not have the risk of causing
the âĂĲcatastrophic forgettingâĂİ problem [17].
Secondly, in our work adversarial perturbation is applied in a
different way compared with Free-Adv. Based on Algorithm 2 in
[17] and the official implementation on GitHub, it is clear that the
Free-Adv utilizes the total perturbation during each replay. From
Figure 8, we show that using total perturbation only (e.g. FGSM
examples) has limited sampling locations which can only cover the
corners and parts of the surface of a l∞ ball. Although the Free-
Adv repeatedly replays the mini-batch several times, its sampling
locations will not change unless most of the pixel values are close
to the clipping boundary. Although people may think that it is
a problem about the hyper-parameter tuning, we argue that the
design of applying adversarial perturbation should be based on the
empirical analysis of iterative adversarial examples proposed in
Section 4.
In order to support our hypothesis, we repeat the experiment in
Section 3 to represent the feature space encoding of the classifier
trained with the Free-Adv. The results are presented in Figure 9
and the legends are the same as those in Figure 1. When the FGSM
examples are used as adversarial inputs, the classifier could group
them together. However, these adversarial inputs and their corre-
sponding targets belong to two separated groups which means the
Free-Adv performs worse than the SIM-Adv. If the adversarial in-
puts are BIM examples, the trained classifier is fooled since the red
dots are separated into several small groups. Overall, the presented
results in Figure 9 reflect that the Free-Adv has a similar issue as
the ATDA and performs even worse than ATDA in MNIST dataset.
This issue is also identified during our evaluation of the Free-Adv
with the details presented in the next section.
MNIST FMNIST CIFAR10
ϵ 0.3 0.2 8255
x˜ FGSM, BIM and Madry examples
Single-Adv Free-Adv and ATDA
Iter-Adv BIM-Adv and Madry-Adv
Network Structure LeNet ResNet
Metric test accuracy and total training time
Platform CleverHans
Table 2: Evaluation Parameter Setting
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we first summarize the evaluation settings. Then, we
present, analyze and compare the evaluation results of our proposed
adversarial training method, SIM-Adv, with other defense methods.
6.1 Evaluation Setting
In this evaluation, we select three different datasets: MNIST, FM-
NIST and CIFAR10. For the MNIST and FMNIST datasets, we select
the LeNet [9] as network structure, while, the ResNet structure [5]
is used in the CIFAR10 dataset. Within each dataset, we evaluate
the performance (classification accuracy) of the trained classifier
against both original and different types of adversarial examples.
As mentioned in Section 2, all the adversarial examples through-
out this work are l∞ white-box untargeted adversarial examples
in the image classification domain. For the method of generating
adversarial examples, our selection includes FGSM, BIM and Madry
which reflects the performance on both Single-Exps (FGSM exam-
ples) and Iter-Exps (BIM and Madry examples). The total pertur-
bation limits are 0.3 in MNIST, 0.2 in FMNIST and 8255 in CIFAR10
which is used in the [12]. To make the evaluation more convincing,
we select larger n2 value in both BIM and Madry examples to make
them stronger than adversarial examples used during training.
As a baseline, we present the evaluation results of the vanilla
classifier, a one with no defense against adversarial examples. To
better evaluate our proposed method, we compare not only with
Single-Adv methods (ATDA and Free-Adv), but also with Iter-Adv
ones (BIM-Adv and Madry-Adv). In the evaluation, we skip adver-
sarially trained models with FGSM or R+FGSM examples. Although
FGSM-Adv and R+FGSM-Adv are single-step version of BIM-Adv
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Vanilla Free-Adv (m = 10) ATDA SIM(10,20)-Adv BIM(10,30)-Adv Madry(10,30)-Adv
M
N
IS
T Original 98.84% 98.72% 97.55% 99.00% 99.01% 99.01%FGSM 4.46% 95.94% 96.37% 96.57% 96.56% 97.03%
BIM(10,40) 0.94% 1.56% 42.34% 92.55% 93.83% 94.04%
Madry(10,40) 0.87% 0.70% 33.14% 92.89% 94.15% 94.29%
FM
N
IS
T Original 91.64% 89.45% 84.64% 88.96% 86.19% 87.14%
FGSM 6.07% 85.69% 83.59% 79.78% 78.34% 75.82%
BIM(10,40) 5.96% 7.39% 25.81% 65.93% 69.71% 64.59%
Madry(10,40) 4.55% 3.99% 23.79% 66.88% 70.58% 69.72%
Vanilla Free-Adv (m = 8) ATDA SIM(2,10)-Adv BIM(4,7)-Adv Madry(4,7)-Adv
CI
FA
R1
0 Original 91.74% 73.96% 89.11% 77.21% 80.83% 81.08%
FGSM 17.89% 48.96% 65.77% 54.12% 56.32% 56.08%
BIM(4,20) 5.56% 38.68% 8.02% 43.69% 46.77% 46.73%
Madry(4,20) 4.82% 38.63% 8.32% 43.78% 46.80% 46.74%
Table 3: Test Accuracy
α FGSM BIM(10,40) Madry(10,40)
MNIST e
−3 93.87% 89.93% 90.11%
e−4 96.57% 92.55% 92.89%
FMNIST e
−3 74.68% 61.07% 61.46%
e−4 79.78% 65.93% 66.88%
Table 4: Test Accuracy of SIM-Adv with Different α
and Madry-Adv, previous studies show that they are failed to de-
fend Iter-Exps [8][20]. In other words, directly setting n1 = n2 = 1
in BIM-Adv or Madry-Adv cannot train a classifier that makes cor-
rect predictions on Iter-Exps. Instead, we present the ATDA and
Free-Adv as representatives of Single-Adv.
For these selected adversarial training methods, we follow the
original setting of hyper-parameters presented in their work and
fine-tune the setting to present the best performance. For our pro-
posed method, we tune its hyper-parameters as follows. Firstly, its
n1 can be select as the same or one half of n1 value in correspond-
ing BIM-Adv method. Secondly, the n2 value is selected among 2
to 5 times of the n1 value due to the over-perturbation. Among
these combinations, we present its best performance. The specific
hyper-parameter values of all methods are presented along with
evaluation results.
During the evaluation, we compare different trained classifiers
in terms of test accuracy which is defined as follows:
test accuracy ≡ # of correctedly classified inputs# of total inputs (17)
Here, the calculation of test accuracy is based on a single category
of inputs (e.g. original examples or FGSM examples). Moreover, we
alsomeasure the total training time consumed by training classifiers
with different methods. To ensure the quality and reproducibility,
adversarial examples used in both training and evaluation are based
on the well-known standard python platform, CleverHans [14]. A
summary of these evaluation settings is also presented in Table 2.
6.2 Test Accuracy
We first evaluate the Free-Adv method. As Table 3 shows, the Free-
Adv classifier can defend both Single-Exps and Iter-Exps in the
CIFAR10 dataset. However, its Iter-Exps accuracy degenerates sig-
nificantly withMNIST and FMNIST datasets. We think this phenom-
enon is related to the second issue of the Free-Adv that is mentioned
in Section 5. The limited searching spacemakes the classifier trained
with the Free-Adv unable to defend the Iter-Exps. In the CIFAR10
dataset, training with the Free-Adv enhances the defence against
Iter-Exps since the per step perturbation is enlarged from 110ϵ to
1
4ϵ .
As a result, the issue of limited searching space is mitigated. Even
in the CIFAR10 dataset, the test accuracy of the classifier trained
with the Free-Adv is still lower than that of our classifier (SIM-Adv),
because SIM-Adv can tune the hyper-parameters (i.e. n1) for more
appropriate per step perturbations.
As shown in Table 3, the performance of the SOTA Single-Adv
(ATDA) is significantly worse than that in [18]. The reason is that
the perturbation limit is too small in the original work. For example,
ϵ in the original evaluation is 4255 instead of
8
255 on CIFAR10 dataset.
As a result, Iter-Exps are similar to Single-Exps and even FGSM-Adv
achieves over 49% test accuracy on Madry examples. Therefore, we
think the original evaluation of ATDA is misleading. Our exclusive
experiments in Section 3 point that ATDA actually fails to defend
Iter-Exps due to the use of: (1) FGSM examples which are less
representative, and (2) domain adaptation loss that is vulnerable to
randomness.
Compared with the Free-Adv and the ATDA methods, the eval-
uation results show that adversarial training with SIM examples
(SIM-Adv) achieves better and more stable performance. In all the
three datasets, the classifier trained with the SIM-Adv can defend
both Single-Exps and Iter-Exps while maintaining a reasonable test
accuracy of original examples. More importantly, the SIM-Adv sig-
nificantly enhances the test accuracy on Iter-Exps over the ATDA
and the Free-Adv. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
Single-Adv method which can efficiently defend Iter-Exps under
the white-box adversary model. To double check, we also test the
SIM-Adv with the same evaluation on the ATDA work in Section
3. The results show that the SIM-Adv can defend both Single-Exps
and Iter-Exps under different values of α and achieve better per-
formance when α is lower. The evaluation results are presented in
Table 4.
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MNIST FMNIST CIFAR10
Free-Adv 234.75 308.5 25923.5
ATDA 319.56 422.4 33011.6
SIM-Adv 293.22 391.2 26692.4
BIM-Adv 866.76 1159.2 111372.6
Table 5: Total Training Time in Seconds
To make our evaluation results more convincing, we also com-
pare the SIM-Adv with SOTA Iter-Adv methods which include both
BIM-Adv and Madry-Adv. The overall results show that the SIM-
Adv has a competitive performance as the BIM-Adv and Madry-Adv.
Although the classifier trained with the SIM-Adv has a degeneration
in terms of test accuracy, we think the less than 4% decrease is a rea-
sonable trade-off given that the SIM-Adv trains the classifier with
weak adversarial examples in some of its training epochs to save
training overhead. Moreover, we could tune the hyper-parameter of
the SIM-Adv to achieve better trade-off between test accuracy and
training cost. For example, the SIM-Adv could perform a two-step
iteration in each training epoch instead of single-step. We leave the
analysis of this for future works.
6.3 Training Time
To fairly evaluate the total training time, we select four different
defense methods: the Free-Adv, the ATDA, the SIM-Adv and the
BIM-Adv. We do not present the Madry-Adv since it has similar
training time as that of BIM-Adv. All of our results are measured
on a Dell Workstation with a NVIDIA RTX-2070 GPU.
The evaluation results in Table 5 clearly show that our SIM-Adv
significantly reduces the total training time compared with the
BIM-Adv. The SIM-Adv saves more than 60% on both MNIST and
FMNIST datasets and more than 75% on CIFAR10 dataset in terms
of total training time. Even compared with the ATDA, our SIM-Adv
can still save at least 7% of total training time since the domain
adaptation loss requires additional computation. When comparing
with the Free-Adv, our proposed SIM-Adv consumes more training
time since it has to save and restore the gradient information across
training epochs.
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we first show through thorough empirical analysis
that the SOTA Single-Adv method (ATDA) is not well evaluated
and fails to defend against Iter-Exps. We also provide thorough
empirical analysis of SOTA Iter-Adv defense methods and draw
insights that can help enhance future Iter-Adv defense methods. In
particular, we show that (1) using larger per step perturbation does
not hurt the performance of Iter-Adv, (2) the intermediate examples
in preparing Iter-Exps reveal the majority of classifier’s blind spots.
Finally, we propose a novel Single-Adv defense method, SIM-Adv,
and highlight its advantages over a recent related work, Free-Adv.
We show through comparative experiments that SIM-Adv is the
first Single-Adv defense method that can efficiently defend against
both Single-Exps and Iter-Exps with much lower training overhead
compared to the SOTA Iter-Adv counterparts.
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